New empirical evidence on the impact of public debt on economic growth in EMU countries by Sosvilla-Rivero, Simón & Gómez-Puig, Marta
Revista de economía mundial 51, 2019, 101-120
ISSN: 1576-0162
New empirical evideNce oN the impact of public debt 
oN ecoNomic growth iN EMU couNtries
Nueva evideNcia empírica sobre el impacto de la deuda pública 
sobre el crecimieNto ecoNómico eN los países de la UEM
Simon Sosvilla-Rivero
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
sosvilla@ccee.ucm.es
 
Marta Gómez-Puig
Universidad de Barcelona
marta.gomezpuig@ub.edu 
Recibido: mayo de 2018; aceptado: septiembre de 2018 
abstract
New empirical evidence is presented on the impact of public debt on eco-
nomic growth. To that end, we employ the Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
(ARDL) bounds testing approach using annual data from both central and pe-
ripheral countries of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) for 
the 1961-2015 period. In particular, we allow for different endogenously (da-
ta-based) regimes in the parameter relating the public debt variable to the real 
growth rate. Our results suggest that the impact of public debt on economic 
growth not only changes across EMU countries, but also over time.
Keywords: Public Debt; Economic Growth; Bounds Testing; European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union; Peripheral Emu Countries; Central Emu Countries. 
resumeN
Se presentan nuevas evidencias empíricas sobre el impacto de la deuda 
pública en el crecimiento económico. Para ese fin, empleamos el método de 
prueba de límites de Retrasos Distribuidos Autorregresivamente (ARDL, por 
sus siglas en inglés) utilizando datos anuales de los países centrales y periféri-
cos de la Unión Económica y Monetaria Europea (UEM) para el período 1961-
2015. En particular, permitimos diferentes regímenes endógenos (basados en 
datos) en el parámetro que relaciona la variable de deuda pública con la tasa 
de crecimiento real. Nuestros resultados sugieren que el impacto de la deuda 
pública en el crecimiento económico no solo cambia entre los países de la 
UEM, sino también con el tiempo.
Palabras clave: Deuda pública; Crecimiento económico; Pruebas de límites; 
Unión Económica y Monetaria Europea; Países periféricos de la UEM; Países 
centrales de la UEM.
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1. iNtroductioN
The nexus between public debt and economic growth has been studied by 
economists for a long time but has recently undergone a notable revival fuelled 
by the substantial deterioration of public finances in many economies as a 
result of the global financial and economic crisis of 2008-2009. In the context 
of the European and Economic Monetary Union (EMU) countries, although 
there is widespread agreement about the potentially adverse consequences for 
EMU economies of their unparalleled levels of public debt, few macroeconomic 
policy debates have generated as much controversy as the austerity argument 
[see Alesina and Ardagna (2010), Alesina et al. (2015), Guajardo et al. (2011) 
or Jordà and Taylor (2016)]. The debate is hotly contested since economists 
are far from having reached a consensus.
From an empirical view, studies can be grouped in two generations of papers 
(see Mitze and Matz, 2015). The “first generation”, that include the works by 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2010), Pattillo et al., (2011), Lof and Malinen (2014), 
Woo and Kumar (2015), Fincke and Greiner (2015) and Jimenez-Rodriguez 
and Rodríguez-López (2015), among others, predominantly focused on the 
nonlinear effects in the debt-growth relationship and predicted an inverted 
U-shape relationship between the two variables (debt begins to harm economic 
growth when the level of debt exceeds a certain threshold, 90% according to the 
seminal paper by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)).  However, the analysis presented 
by a “second generation” of empirical studies [Ghosh et al. (2013), Markus and 
Rainer (2016), Chudik et al. (2017), Pescatori et al. (2014), Edberhardt and 
Presbitero (2015) or Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018)] goes beyond the 
nonlinearities in the relationship and focuses in the eventual presence of an 
heterogeneous debt-growth nexus across countries since now is widely agreed 
that the effects of public debt on growth may vary depending on country-
specific macroeconomic, financial and institutional variables. Nonetheless, 
although there is also a wide consensus on the fact that heterogeneities in the 
debt-growth relationship may be found not only across countries but also over 
time (as long as the country-specific factors are not static, but evolve over time), 
to our knowledge no empirical study has studied them yet. 
In particular, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) empirically investigated 
whether the short and the long run impact of public debt on economic growth 
differed across EMU countries (both central and peripheral) for the 1961-2015 
period by means of estimating a production function augmented with a debt 
104 Simon SoSvilla-RiveRo, maRta Gómez-PuiG
stock term and applying the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds 
testing approach. Nonetheless, the empirical results presented in that paper 
were average values for the entire sample period and did not take into account 
the possibility that they could change over time if a structural break occurred. 
Therefore, the objective of this paper is to explore the possibility of multi-
ple structural changes in the parameter relating the public debt variable to the 
real growth rate, therefore allowing for different endogenously (data-based) 
regimes and identifying heterogeneities in both the temporal and country im-
pact of public debt on economic performance. This is a very relevant topic 
since a time-varying debt-growth relationship in line with the evolution of the 
country-specific factors (macroeconomic financial or institutional) will imply 
that rigid criteria will not be advisable when addressing the necessary adjust-
ments. In addition, our analysis represents an important contribution to the 
existing literature since, as far as we know, this is the first paper that analyses 
the heterogeneities in the debt-growth nexus, not only across countries, but 
also over time. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the ana-
lytical framework and the econometric methodology. Section 3 describes our 
data. Section 4 present the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 provides some 
concluding remarks.
 
2. aNalytical framework aNd ecoNometric methodology
Departing from the previous literature that analysed the relationship be-
tween debt and economic growth estimating an equation based on the growth 
literature (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004) augmented by public debt, 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) follows Edberhardt and Presbitero 
(2015) and explore the debt–growth nexus using an aggregate production 
function in which public debt is included as a separate factor of production:
( , , , )t t t t tY AF K L H D=                                          (1)
where Y is the level of output, A is an index of technological progress, K is 
the stock of physical capital, L is the labour input, H is the human capital, and 
D is the stock of public debt1. 
Regarding the inclusion of the public debt stock as an input in an aggregated 
production function2, both Brauninger (2003) and Greiner (2007) present and 
1 We do not consider the stock of technological capital (estimated using data on R&D) because we 
do not have data for the entire sample period, so the results should be taken with caution since this 
omitted variable could be potentially correlated with the stock of public debt. Nevertheless, the data 
used for the stock of physical capital include computer software and intangible fixed assets (Eurostat, 
1996).
2 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for suggesting a justification of the use of this approach.
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analyse an endogenous growth model using a production function with public 
debt. This inclusion could be justified on the basis that debt financing of public 
investment creates incentives for providing public infrastructure projects that 
contribute to growth in demand and to increase productivity (see, e. g., Kopits, 
2001)3.  Since public services lead to external economies and, accordingly, 
lower production costs, we can state, following Arrow and Kurtz (1970), that 
production in the private sector would be directly affected by those goods and 
services provided by the public sector. Indeed, some authors like Aschauer 
(1989a,b,c) and Bajo-Rubio and Sosvilla-Rivero (1993) have forcefully argued 
for a direct and sizeable effect of public sector capital accumulation on private 
sector productivity and performance4. Nevertheless, as debt-to-growth ratio 
increases, it makes creditors to demand for higher interest rates to mitigate 
the default risk. Thus, this may lead to a rise in the cost of financing, which 
could limit investment and production (Greenlaw et al., 2013). Similarly, results 
in Huanget al. (2018) indicate that the relationship between public debt and 
investment is likely to be causal and that public debt crowds out corporate 
investment by tightening credit constraints.
For simplicity, the technology is assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form: 
31 2 4
t t t t tY AK L H D
αα α α=                                           (2)
so that, after taking logs and denominating by a small letter the log of its 
corresponding capital letter, we obtain
1 2 3 4t t t t ty k l h dα α α α α= + + + +                                   (3)
As can be seen, equation (3) postulates a technical long-run relationship 
between (the log of) the level of production (yt), (the log of) the stock of physical 
capital (kt), (the log of) the labour employed (lt), (the log of) the human capital 
(ht) and (the log of) the stock of public debt (dt). 
Equation (3) can be estimated from sufficiently long time series by cointe-
gration econometric techniques. So, we make use of the Autoregressive Dis-
tributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration proposed by 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001). 
3  Debt financing of public investment is further considered to be in line with the benefit principle of 
taxation or (as Musgrave (1939) calls it) the “pay as you use principle”, and thus is consistent with a 
fair intergenerational distribution (see Yakita, 1994).
4 The special treatment of public investment in the Stability and Growth Pact is to some extent 
motivated by fear that the EMU fiscal rules are likely to depress the volume of growth-enhancing 
public investment and thus to reduce economic performance in the future (see, e. g., Buiter, 2001; 
Balassone and Franco, 2000).
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The application of the ARDL approach to cointegration involves estimating 
the following unrestricted error correction model (UECM)
31 2 4
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
qq q qp
t i t i i t i i t i i t i i t i
i i i i i
t t t t t t
y y k l h d
y k l h d
β γ ω ϕ υ φ
λ λ λ λ λ ε
− − − − −
= = = = =
− − − − −
∆ = + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +
+ + + + + +
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
         (4)
 
where Δ denotes the first difference operator, β is the drift component, and 
εt is assumed to be a white noise process. Note that p is the number of lags of 
the dependent variable and qi is the number of lags of the i-th explanatory vari-
able. The optimal lag structure of the first differenced regression (4) is selected 
by the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 
(SBC) to simultaneously correct for residual serial correlation and the problem 
of endogenous regressors (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p. 386). In order to de-
termine the existence of a long-run relationship between the variables under 
study, Pesaran, Shin and Smith (2001) propose two alternative tests. First, an 
F-statistic is used to test the joint significance of the first lag of the variables in 
levels used in the analysis (i.e. 1 2 3 4 5 0λ λ λ λ λ= = = = = ), and then a t-statis-
tic is used to test the individual significance of the lagged dependent variable 
in levels (i. e. 1 0λ = ). 
Based on two sets of critical values: I(0) and I(1) (Pesaran, Shin, and Smith 
2001), if the calculated F-or t-statistics exceed the upper bound I(1), we con-
clude in favour of a long-run relationship, regardless of the order of integration. 
However, if these statistics are below the lower bound I(0), the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration cannot be rejected. Finally, if the calculated F- and t-statis-
tics fall between the lower and the upper bound, the results are inconclusive. 
If cointegration exists, the conditional long-run model is derived from the 
reduced form equation (4) when the series in first differences are jointly equal 
to zero (i. e., Δy=Δk= Δl=Δd=0). The calculation of these estimated long-run 
coefficients is given by:
   1 2 3 4 5t t t t t ty k l h dδ δ δ δ δ ξ= + + + + +                             (5)
Finally, if a long-run relation is found, an error correction representation ex-
ists which is estimated from the following reduced form equation:
  
31 2 4
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
qq q qp
t i t i t i t i t i t t
i i i i i
y y k l h d ECMθ ϖ π τ ψ η− − − − − −
= = = = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑            (6)
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3. data
We use annual data covering the period 1961-2015 (i.e., a total of 54 an-
nual observations) for eleven EMU countries: both central (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands) and peripheral member states 
(Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain).
To maintain as much homogeneity as possible for a sample of 11 coun-
tries over the course of five decades, our primary source is the European 
Commission´s AMECO database5.  We then strengthen our data with the use 
of supplementary data sourced from International Monetary Fund (Interna-
tional Financial Statistics) and the World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
We use GDP, net capital stock and public debt (all expressed at 2010 market 
prices) for Y, K and D, as well as civilian employment and life expectancy at 
birth for L and H6. The precise definitions and sources of the variables are given 
in Appendix 1.
4. empirical results
After checking that all variables can be treated as first-difference stationary7, 
Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) estimate an ARDL representation with 
4 lags selected using the AIC and SBC information criteria and offer evidence 
on the existence of a long-run relation between the output and its components, 
as suggested by equation (3). In particular, they find that the long-term effect of 
debt on economic performance registers a negative value in all EMU countries, 
but its magnitude differs significantly across countries. While comparatively 
high impacts are estimated in the case of France (-0.544), Portugal (-0.354), 
Spain (-0.336), and Austria (-0.129), in the rest of countries, although negative, 
the magnitude is very small with values close to zero. Ireland (-0.049), Finland 
(-0.049) and Germany (-0.040) are the countries with the lowest negative 
impact. 
Regarding the short-term dynamics, Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero 
(2018) estimate an error-correction model associated with the long-run re-
lationship, detecting a heterogeneous short-run impact of debt on economic 
performance. Interestingly, they document that even though there is a long- run 
negative impact in Portugal and Spain, the short-term effect is positive (0.063 
and 0.067), although quite small. In the cases of Greece, Ireland and Italy, they 
find that an increase in public debt exert a negative effect on GDP, not only in 
the long run but in the short run as well. Among central EMU countries, their 
5  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/ameco/index_en.htm
6 As explained in Appendix 1, following Sachs and Warner (1997), we use life expectancy at birth as 
the human-capital proxy.
7  These results (not shown here in order to save space, but available from the authors upon request) 
are based on both Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests ((where the null is a unit root against the 
alternative of stationary process) and on the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) (KPSS) tests (where the null is 
a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root).
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results suggest that in Germany and Finland the effect of public debt on GDP is 
positive in the short run (0.375 and 0.059) despite the negative (though very 
small) effect in the long run. Finally, in the case of Austria, Belgium, France and 
the Netherlands their results suggest that public debt has a negative impact on 
economic activity in both the short and the long run. 
Nevertheless, the empirical results presented in Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-
Rivero (2018) are average values for the entire sample period (1961-2015) 
and do not take into account the possibility that they could change over time if 
a structural break occurred. Therefore, the objective of the present paper is to 
explore the possibility of multiple structural changes in the parameter relating 
the public debt variable to the real growth rate (ψt) in equation (6) by using the 
Bai and Perron (1998) test8. The results (not shown here to save space, but 
available from the authors upon request) seem to suggest strongly that there 
are two structural breaks in each of the estimated models. The detected break 
dates and the associated levels of public debt-to-GDP ratio are displayed in 
Table 1.
table 1: results of the structural chaNges test iN the coefficieNt of the public debt
  AT BE FI FR GE GR IE IT NL PT SP
Structural 
break 1
1987 
(58%)
1977 
(60%)
1991 
(22%)
1986 
(31%)
1983 
(39%)
1979 
(23%)
1988 
(107%)
1976
(56%)
1978 
(41%)
1986 
(57%)
1993 
(52%)
Structural 
break 2
 2007 
 (60%)
 2005 
 (92%)
 2007 
 (35%)
 2005 
 (67%)
 2008 
 (67%)
 2008 
(113%)
 2007 
 (25%)
 2007 
(106%)
 2008 
 (58%)
 2003 
 (56%)
 2009 
 (54%)
Notes: AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively.
In the ordinary brackets, the associated levels of public debt-to-GDP ratio are given.
As can be seen, in all the countries under study, the first break point 
occurred before 1999 (i.e., before the beginning of the EMU). It is located in 
the seventies in four countries: (1) Belgium ,−with the starting of an interest 
snowball from 1977 that led to one of the largest increases in debt-to-GDP 
ratios in advanced economies (Mauro and Zilinsky, 2016), (2) Greece, when 
this country entered a period of stagflation, caused by the second oil shock 
of 1979 (Alogoskoufis, 2012), (3) Italy, after a currency crisis in a period of 
severe political instability (Lubitz, 1978), and (4) the Netherlands, following 
a major change in economic policy (OECD, 1979). It occurred in the eighties 
in five economies: (1) Austria, around the introduction of measures to deal 
with serious structural problems in public finances (Katterl and Köhler-
8 Bai and Perron (1998) consider the estimation of multiple structural shifts in a linear model estimated 
by least squares. They propose some tests for structural changes and a selection procedure based on 
a sequence of tests to estimate consistently both the number of breaks and the induced structural 
regimes in a linear model. We follow their recommendation and use a trimming region of 15%. We 
allow the system to search for a maximum of five breaks, which is the largest permissible number 
according to the Bai and Perron procedure. 
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Töglhofer, 2005), (2) France, after a period of fiscal consolidation that resulted 
in a stabilization of the debt-to-GDP ratio (Corsetti and  Roubini, 1991), (3) 
Germany, in the aftermath of the recession of 1983-1985 which introduced 
stagflation (Siebert, 2005), (4) Ireland, in a context of sustained real GDP 
expansion that lulled policymakers into a false sense of security regarding the 
sustainability of the revenues from cyclically sensitive taxes (Honohan, 2009), 
and (5) Portugal, marked by a second IMF-supported stabilization program, 
1983–1985. Finally, it took place in the nineties in the other two EMU 
countries in our sample: (1) Finland, after experiencing a banking crisis in 1991 
that worsened the fiscal balance (Reinhart, 2009), and (2) Spain, coinciding 
with a severe economic crisis in 1993. Moreover, it is noticeable that the public 
debt-to-GDP ratio associated to the first break point surpasses the level of 
60% only in Ireland (107%). 
Regarding the second break point, in all cases it took place after the 
implementation of the common currency and in eight out of the 11 cases 
under study it occurred in 2007 or later, coinciding with the global financial 
and economic crisis. Specifically, it took place in 2007 (coinciding with the 
subprime crisis in the United States) in Austria, Finland, Ireland and Italy; 
in 2008 (when Lehman Brothers collapsed) in Germany, Greece and the 
Netherlands; and in 2009 (coinciding with the beginning of the EMU sovereign 
crisis) in Spain9. However, in all countries but Spain, the second break date 
occurred before the economic recession reached its trough during the third 
regime, which pushed public debt up to unprecedented levels. Therefore, it 
can be observed that the associated debt-to-GDP ratio clearly increases in the 
second break point compared with the first one, presenting values of above 
60% in 6 out of the 11 countries under study. Specifically, it occurs at ratios 
marginally above that value in Austria, Germany and France; slightly above 
90% in Belgium and above 100% in Italy and Greece. 
If we focus on peripheral EMU countries, it can be observed that whilst 
in Spain and Portugal the public debt-to-GDP ratios associated with the two 
break dates are very similar (55% on average), in the other three countries they 
diverge significantly. As can be seen, in Greece the public debt-to-GDP ratio 
increases from 23% in the first break point (1979) to 113% in the second one 
(2008). A similar pattern is found in Italy, where it rises from 56% in 1976 to 
106% in 2007. Nonetheless, the behaviour in Ireland is completely different: 
the ratio was 107% at the first break point (1988) and decreased to 25% at 
the second one (2007), indicating that the substantial debt accumulation in 
2007-2008 was preceded by a huge deleverage period in that country.
Next, we utilize this information and form three regimes for each coun-
try. The idea is to re-estimate the regression model including a dummy vari-
able that incorporates the detected breakpoints and gauge whether structural 
breaks have disturbed the effect of public debt on the real growth rate:
9  In 2009 Spanish public deficit reached a historical peak of 11.0% of GDP.
110 Simon SoSvilla-RiveRo, maRta Gómez-PuiG
31 2 4 4 4
1 2 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
qq q q q qp
t i t i t i t i t i t i t t i t t t
i i i i i i i
y y k l h d d D d D ECMθ ϖ π τ ψ ψ ψ η− − − − − − − −
= = = = = = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
31 2 4 4 4
1 2 3
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1 2
qq q q q qp
t i t i t i t i t i t i t t i t t t
i i i i i i i
y y k l h d d D d D ECMθ ϖ π τ ψ ψ ψ η− − − − − − − −
= = = = = = =
∆ = ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑
            (7)
where D1t is a dummy variable taking value 0 from 1961 until T1-1 and 1 
between T1 and T2-1 and D2t is a dummy variable taking value 0 from 1961 
until T2-1 and 1 between T2 and T, being T1 and T2 the detected break dates. 
From the significant coefficients estimated using equation (7), following 
Hendry (1995)’s suggestion, we can compute for every country the short-term 
impact of debt on economic performance during each of the three regimes as: 
short-term effects in regime j=  
4
1 1
/ (1 ),
q p
j
i i
i i
ψ θ
= =
−∑ ∑  j=1,2,3 (8)
The full estimations results are reported in Appendix 2, while the estimated 
short-term effects are presented in Table 2. As can be seen, we find very different 
results across central and peripheral countries. 
table 2: short-ruN aNalysis with structural breaks
Central EMU countries Short-term Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Austria
-0.331*
(-2.994)
[1961-2015]
-0.119*
(-3.393)
[1961-1986]
-0.158*
(-3-011)
[1987-2006]
-0.074*
(-3.082)
[2007-2015]
Belgium
-0.186**
(-4.346)
[1961-2015]
-0.295**
(-3.945)
[1961-1976]
-0.271**
(-2.740)
[1977-2004]
-0.376*
(-3.842)
[2005-2015]
Finland
0.059*
(4.950)
[1961-2015]
0.074*
(3.6448)
[1961-1990]
-0.036*
(-3.067)
[1991-2006]
-0.037*
(-3.741)
[2007-2015]
France
-0.054*
(-3.252)
[1961-2015]
-0.062*
(-3.149)
[1961-1985]
-0.030*
(-2.951)
[1986-2004]
-0.014*
(-3.287)
[2005-2015]
Germany
0.375*
(3.882)
[1961-2015]
0.308*
(4.117)
[1961-1982]
-0.106*
(-3.696)
[1983-2007]
-0.044*
(-4.358)
[2008-2015]
Netherlands
-0.031*
(-3.936)
[1961-2015]
-0.027*
(-3.643)
[1961-1977]
-0.008*
(-3.200)
[1978-2007]
-0.037*
(-2.918)
[2008-2015]
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Peripheral EMU countries Short-term Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Greece
-0.195*
(-3.732)
[1961-2015]
-0.017*
(-3.874)
[1961-1978]
-0.052*
(-3.701)
[1979-2007]
-0.255*
(-2.933)
[2008-2015]
Ireland
-0.077*
(-3.902)
[1961-2015]
-0.090**
(-2.740)
[1961-1987]
-0.137*
(-3.624)
[1988-2006]
0.031*
(-2.870)
[2007-2015]
Italy
-0.143*
(-3.714)
[1961-2015]
-0.143*
(-3.526)
[1961-1975]
-0.098*
(-3-702)
[1976-2006]
-0.391*
(-3.689)
[2007-2015]
Portugal
0.063*
(3.187)
[1961-2015]
-0.056*
(3.160)
[1961-1985]
0.097**
 (2.813)
[1986-2002]
-0.174*
(-2.971)
[2003-2015]
Spain
0.067*
(2.882)
[1961-2015]
0.072*
(2.997)
[1961-1992]
-0.016**
(-2.805)
[1993-2008]
-0.029*
(-2.945)
[2009-2015]
Notes: AT, BE, FI, FR, GE, GR, IE, IT, NL, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain respectively.
In the ordinary brackets below the parameter estimates, the corresponding t-statistics are shown.
In the square brackets, the sample period for each regime is given.
The short-run effects of public debt on economic growth are calculated using equations (7) and (8) 
* and ** denote statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
Regarding central EMU countries, with the exception of France, in countries 
where debt had a negative short-run effect on growth (Austria, Belgium, and 
the Netherlands), these inverse relationships between debt and growth seem 
to strengthen throughout the detected regimes. However, in Germany and Fin-
land (where debt had a positive short-run effect on growth), we only detect a 
positive relationship between these two variables during the first regime (i.e., 
before the first break point). Subsequently, from 1983 and 1991 onwards, 
debt also exerts a negative effect on growth in Germany and Finland respec-
tively.
Interestingly, in peripheral EMU countries, although we found that the 
short-run effect was positive in Portugal and Spain, a positive relationship be-
tween debt and the real growth rate during the first regime is only found in 
the Spanish case. However, it is noticeable that in this economy, although the 
relationship changes to negative from 1993 until the end of the sample, its 
magnitude is very small (-0.016 and -0.029 in the second and third regime, 
respectively). In the case of Portugal, we find a temporary positive coefficient 
after the first detected break (during the 1986-2002 period), followed by a 
further negative coefficient after the second break, reinforcing the inverse as-
sociation between the variables under study from then on. Moreover, a small 
positive relationship (0.031) between debt and growth is also found in Ireland 
during the third regime (2007-2015) where, after an important deleveraging 
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process, the debt-to-GDP ratio reached a value of 25% in 2007. Finally, in 
the other two peripheral EMU countries (Italy and Greece), we find a negative 
relationship between the two examined variables not only in the short-term, 
but throughout the three examined regimes as well. This behaviour could be 
related to the fact that these two countries present the highest average debt-
to-GDP ratio during the 1961-2015 period (75% and 69% respectively).
figure 1a: debt-growth relatioNship iN peripheral emu couNtries
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IRELAND
Public Debt-to-GDP
1988: Debt-to-GDP =107%
2007: Debt-to-GDP =25%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.09
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.14
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = 0.03
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ITALY
Public Debt-to-GDP
1976: Debt-to-GDP =56%
2007: Debt-to-GDP =106%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.14
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.10
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.39
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GREECE
Public Debt-to-GDP
1979: Debt-to-GDP =23%
2008: Debt-to-GDP =113%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.02
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.05
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.1638
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PORTUGAL
Public Debt-to-GDP
1986: Debt-to-GDP =57% 2003: Debt-to-GDP =56%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.06
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = 0.10
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.17
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SPAIN
Public Debt-to-GDP
1993: Debt-to-GDP =52%
2009: Debt-to-GDP =54%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = 0.07
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.02
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.03
Figures 1a and 1b summarize the main results for peripheral and central 
EMU countries respectively. Specifically, they present for each EMU country: 
(1) the two break points with the associated debt-to-GDP ratio and (2) the 
evolution of the marginal impact of sovereign debt ratio on economic growth in 
the three regimes into which the sample period is split.  
Figure 1a shows the existence of a positive relationship between the 
public debt-to-GDP ratio and economic growth in some sub-periods in three 
peripheral EMU countries: Spain (from 1961 until 1992), Portugal (from 
1986 until 2002), and Ireland (between 2007 and 2015). Therefore, with 
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the exception of Ireland, in the other two peripheral EMU countries (which 
also registered a positive short-run effect), the relationship between public 
debt and economic growth only becomes negative from a debt-to-GDP ratio 
between 50% and 60%. Moreover, again with the exception of Ireland, the 
highest detrimental marginal impact of public debt on peripheral countries’ 
economic performance takes place after the second break point (mainly from 
2007 to 2009, coinciding with the global financial crisis), with debt-to-GDP 
ratios that range from 55% (Spain and Portugal) to slightly above 100% (Italy 
and Greece), being Spain the peripheral country where the negative impact is 
lower during the crisis episode.
figure 1b: debt-growth relatioNship iN ceNtral emu couNtries
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AUSTRIA
Public Debt-to-GDP
1987: Debt-to-GDP =58%
2007: Debt-to-GDP =60%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.12
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.16
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.07
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BELGIUM
Public Debt-to-GDP
1977: Debt-to-GDP =60%
2005: Debt-to-GDP =92%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.29
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.27
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.38
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FINLAND
Public Debt-to-GDP
1991: Debt-to-GDP =22%
2007: Debt-to-GDP =35%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = 0.07
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.04
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.04
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FRANCE
Public Debt-to-GDP
1986: Debt-to-GDP =31%
2005: Debt-to-GDP =67%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.06
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.03
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.01
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GERMANY
Public Debt-to-GDP
1983: Debt-to-GDP =39%
2008: Debt-to-GDP =67%
Regime 1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = 0.31
Regime 2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.11
Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.04
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THE NETHERLANDS
Public Debt-to-GDP
1978: Debt-to-GDP =41%
2008: Debt-to-GDP =58%
Regime1: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.04
Regime2: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.073 1
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Regime 3: 
marginal impact 
on growth = -0.04
Source: AMECO, IMF and own estimates.
The highest negative marginal impact also takes place after the second 
break date in three out of the six central EMU countries (see Figure 1b). In 
Finland and the Netherlands, it occurs from 2007-2008 (with a debt-to-GDP 
level that ranges from 35% to 58%), while in Belgium it takes place from 2005 
with debt-to-GDP levels above 90%.  
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Therefore, our results seem to suggest that the debt-to-GDP ratio at which 
public debt exerts the strongest negative impact on economic growth, not 
only changes across EMU countries, but also over time. In seven out of eleven 
countries, the negative impact is especially high in times of distress, but the 
associated debt ratio clearly differs across countries. Whilst in some countries 
it takes place at low ratios (e.g., at 35% in Finland), in others it occurs at very 
high values (90% in Belgium and above 100% in Italy and Greece). In addi-
tion, the highest negative marginal impact also differs across EMU countries. 
The maximum negative values are observed in Italy and Belgium (-0.391 and 
-0.376), whilst the minimum is registered in Spain (-0.029).
 
5. coNcludiNg remarks
Despite the severe sovereign debt crisis in the EMU, few papers have 
examined the relationship between debt and growth for member states. The 
limited body of literature available focuses on the existence of nonlinearities in 
the relationship and lends support to the presence of a common debt threshold 
across EMU countries. However, to our knowledge, the empirical work that 
analyses the eventual heterogeneities in the relationship (both across countries 
and over time) is still very scarce, even though they are acknowledged by the 
literature. Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) is one exception, although the 
analysis in that paper is focused in the different incidence of debt accumulation 
on economic growth taking into account the particular characteristics of 
each EMU economy, but it disregards whether the effects may also differ 
depending on the time horizon if a structural break occurred. So, the present 
study complements the paper of Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018) since 
heterogeneities in the debt-growth relationship are not only examined across 
countries, but also over time. 
To that end, as in Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2018), in this paper we 
use time series analyses to estimate, for each country in the sample, a log-
linearized Cobb–Douglas production function augmented with a debt stock 
term, by means of the ARDL testing approach to cointegration. However, the 
analysis is extended by allowing the coefficient estimates capturing in the short 
run dynamics the effect of public debt variable to differ before and after two 
endogenously (data-based) identified structural breaks. Our results indicate 
that debt exerts a positive effect on growth in the first regime in Finland, 
Germany and Spain (from 1961 until 1990, 1982 and 1992 respectively); 
whilst a positive relationship is found in the second regime in the case of 
Portugal (between 1986 and 2002). In all cases, the positive relationship 
between a debt increase and economic growth is found when the indebtedness 
level is either low or moderate (i.e., in sustainable debt periods). Moreover, 
within EMU peripheral countries, Spain is the one that presents the lowest 
negative relationship between debt and growth during the distress episode 
(-0.029).  
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Our findings have significant policy implications, since they suggest that the 
impact of public debt on economic growth changes both across EMU countries 
and over time, implying that rigid and uniform criteria are not advisable when 
addressing the necessary adjustments. Specifically, our findings suggest that 
the pace of fiscal adjustment should be adapted to the evolving characteristics 
of each country over time. Therefore, the speed of progress toward a specified 
fiscal target is an open question, although gradualism can be a powerful tool in 
helping achieve the objectives of a broader growth strategy (Dewatripont and 
Roland 1995). In any case, in our view, adjustment programmes should be ac-
companied by structural reforms able to increase the adjustment capacity or 
the potential GDP in euro area countries. 
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appeNdix 1: defiNitioN of the explaNatory variables aNd data sources
Variable Description Source
Level of Output (Yt)
Gross domestic product at 2010 
market prices
Annual Macroeconomic 
Database-European Com-
mission (AMECO)
Capital Stock (Kt)
Net capital stock at 2010 market 
prices, total economy
AMECO
Accumulated public debt (Dt)
General government consolidated 
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